一、（大赛目的与宗旨）构建全国法律翻译竞赛平台，选拔并培养优势突出的高端法律和翻译人才。

二、（大赛历史）“华政杯”全国法律翻译大赛最早于2010年12月举办，至今已成功举办七届。第一届参赛院校32所；第二届参赛院校41所；第三届参赛院校47所；第四届参赛院校77所，律所、法院、翻译公司等其他单位13个；第五届参赛院校91所，其他单位22个；第六届参赛院校69所，其他单位24个，第七届参赛院校156所，其他单位23个。大赛影响日益扩大，受到《文汇报》、《法制日报》、《中国社会科学报》、《新民晚报》、《英语世界》等报刊及上海教育电视台的关注。

三、（主办、承办、协办单位）

（一）主办单位
华东政法大学
全国翻译专业学位（MTI）研究生教育指导委员会
教育部高等学校翻译专业（BTI）教学协作组
中国翻译协会法律翻译委员会

（二）承办单位
华东政法大学外语学院
华东政法大学法律翻译中心
华东政法大学法律翻译研究所
华东政法大学法律语言学研究所

（三）协办单位
上海市法学会法学翻译研究会
商务印书馆《英语世界》杂志社
《法制日报》社
上海外服国际人才培训中心
英国皇家特许语言家学会中国分会(CIOL China Association)

四、（大赛组委会）

（一）大赛顾问（按姓氏拼音排序）
何勤华 原华东政法大学校长、教授、博士生导师、全国外国法制史研究会会长
许 钧 长江学者特聘教授、浙江大学特聘教授、博士生导师、中国译协常务副会长
仲伟合 广东外语外贸大学校长、教授、博士生导师、MTI教指委副主任委员

（二）历届颁奖嘉宾与评委名单（按姓氏拼音排序）
艾米·莎蒙丝（Amy L. Sommers） 高盖茨律师事务所(K&L Gates LLP)上海办事处合伙人
柴明熲 上海外国语大学高级翻译学院名誉院长、教授、博士生导师
丹·格特曼（Dan Guttman） 北京大学访问学者
杜金榜 广东外语外贸大学教授、博士生导师、中国法律语言学会会长
杜志淳 原华东政法大学党委书记、教授、博士生导师
傅敬民 上海市科技翻译学会副理事长、教授
郭伟清 上海市高级人民法院副院长
何刚强 复旦大学翻译系教授、博士生导师、上海市科技翻译学会理事长
何勤华 原华东政法大学校长、教授、博士生导师、全国外国法制史研究会会长
胡开宝 上海交通大学外国语学院院长、教授、博士生导师
黄爱武 上海市浦东新区司法局副局长
黄宁宁 国浩律师事务所上海办公室管理合伙人、主任
蒋安杰 《法制日报》理论部主任
李克兴 原香港理工大学中文及双语系教授、法律翻译专家
李 立 中国政法大学外国语学院院长，教授
林 巍 暨南大学外籍专家、教授
林燕萍 华东政法大学副校长、教授、博士生导师
刘大力 君合律师事务所合伙人
刘 平 上海市人民政府法制办公室副主任
刘蔚铭 原西北政法大学外语学院副院长、教授、法律语言研究所所长
刘晓红 上海政法学院校长、教授、博士生导师
陆 敏 上海市浦东海关副关长
罗培新 上海市人民政府法制办副主任、教授、博士生导师
马 莉 华东政法大学外语学院教授
马庆林 西北政法大学外语学院院长、教授
茆荣华 上海市高级人民法院副院长
梅德明 上海外国语大学海外合作学院院长、教授、博士生导师
穆 雷 广东外语外贸大学高级翻译学院教授、博士生导师
欧阳美和 上海政法学院国际交流学院院长、教授
平 洪 广东外语外贸大学高级翻译学院教授
屈文生 教育部长江学者青年学者、华东政法大学外语学院院长、教授
阮祝军 上海市人民检察院政治部主任
沙丽金 中国政法大学外语学院副院长、教授
邵慧翔 原上海市人民政府外事办公室副主任
沈 伟 山东大学法学院院长、教授
施基雄 上海市法学会专职副会长
施伟东 上海市委政法委员会研究室主任
唐 波 华东政法大学副校长、教授、博士生导师
汪闽燕 《法制日报》国际部副主任
王振华 上海交通大学外国语学院教授、博士生导师
吴 坚 段和段律师事务所主任律师
伍巧芳 华东政法大学外语学院副院长、教授
夏永芳 上海市外事翻译工作者协会常务副会长
肖云枢 西南政法大学外语学院教授、学科带头人
谢天振 上海外国语大学翻译研究所所长、教授、博士生导师
许 钧 长江学者特聘教授、浙江大学特聘教授、博士生导师、中国译协常务副会长
许 旭 中化国际（控股）股份有限公司法律部总经理
杨 平 中国翻译协会副秘书长、《中国翻译》副主编
杨忠孝 华东政法大学发展规划处处长、教授、博士生导师
姚锦清 上海外国语大学高级翻译学院教授
姚骏华 原华东政法大学外语学院党委书记、副教授
袁筱一 华东师范大学外语学院院长、教授、博士生导师
叶 芳 锦天城律师事务所高级合伙人
叶 青 华东政法大学校长、教授、博士生导师
叶兴国 上海市外文学会会长，上海对外经贸大学前副校长、教授
余素青 华东政法大学外语学院党委书记、教授
张法连 中国法律英语教学与测试研究会会长，中国政法大学外国语学院教授
张国庆 《法制日报》副总编
章丽红 前德国拜耳大中国区人力资源副总裁
张 清 中国政法大学外语学院副院长、教授、博士生导师
张绍全 西南政法大学外语学院院长、教授
张智强 上海中医药大学党委书记、教授
张朱平 华东政法大学外语学院副院长、副教授
赵军峰 广东外语外贸大学高级翻译学院院长、教授，全国翻译专业学位研究生教育指导委员会秘书长
郑 戈 上海交通大学法学院教授
朱榄叶 华东政法大学国际法学院教授、博士生导师
朱林海 锦天城律师事务所高级合伙人、浦东律工委主任

五、（决赛获奖证书盖章）
“华政杯”全国法律翻译大赛组委会
全国翻译专业学位研究生教育指导委员会
教育部高等学校翻译专业教学协作组

六、（参赛对象）
欢迎全国各高校各专业在校本科生、硕士生及博士生踊跃参赛，比赛不限专业和年级，不分组别。
已参加工作或自由职业者也可参加比赛，参赛年龄需在40周岁以下（1977年1月1日以后出生）。

七、（比赛方式）
比赛分为初赛和决赛两轮。初赛为英译汉（只有笔译）；决赛包括笔译和口译，既有英译汉，也有汉译英。试题形式包括法学学术文章翻译、法律法规翻译、律师常用法律文书翻译等。

（一）初赛
初赛采取开卷方式，译文文责自负，选手务必独立完成，杜绝抄袭现象，一经发现，将取消参赛资格。初赛试题见下文，参赛选手根据试题要求答题，并于2017年6月7日（含）前将全部试题译文及《初赛选手信息表》（见下文）发送到ecuplds@163.com（只接收电子信箱投稿）。
译文应为WORD电子文档，中文宋体、英文Times New Roman字体，全文小四号字，1.5倍行距，文档命名格式为“XXX大学/单位XXX人名（学校名或单位名加姓名）译文”，同时发送填写完整的初赛选手信息表，文档命名格式为“XXX（姓名）大赛报名表”。
选手发送的答案须标明题号，并只发送中文。译文正文内不要出现译者任何个人信息，杜绝抄袭，否则将被视为无效译文。组委会将在收到参赛作品后回复确认邮件，三日内没有收到回复的选手请再次发送答案。收到回复的，请勿重复发送答案。

（二）决赛
初赛成绩排名前50名的参赛选手可进入决赛。请关注华东政法大学外语学院官方网站公布的入围名单。组委会将向进入决赛选手的电子信箱和手机分别发送入围通知。初赛及决赛参赛者均无需缴纳任何报名费用，入围考生参加决赛的交通费及食宿费等自理。
决赛地点设在华东政法大学松江校区（龙源路555号）。入围决赛选手凭身份证和学生证入场，统一参加笔译和口译考试。决赛以纯闭卷形式进行。笔译试卷由监考老师现场沿骑缝线装订，经大赛评委匿名评审，综合考生口译成绩（满分100分，其中决赛笔译成绩占70%，决赛口译成绩占30%），确定比赛结果，并于次日举行颁奖仪式。所有获奖选手无特殊理由不得缺席颁奖仪式。

八、赛程安排
1、2017年4月24日—6月7日公布初赛试题。选手可在此期间将答卷发送至指定电子信箱，收到回复后不得重复投递。6月7日之后停止接收答卷。
2、2017年6月9日—6月15日初赛评卷。
3、2017年6月16日公布入围决赛选手名单（请见华东政法大学外语学院官方网站http://www.wyxy.ecupl.edu.cn）。
4、2017年6月23日 9:00—16:00决赛，其中9:00-11:00笔译，13:00-16:00口译。地点均设在华东政法大学松江校区（具体考场另行公布）。

九、奖项设置
本次比赛将设特等奖1名，一等奖4名，二等奖8名，三等奖20名，优胜奖12名，分别予以奖励。特等奖设奖金3000元，一等奖设奖金2000元，二等奖设奖金1500元，三等奖设奖金800元，优胜奖设奖金500元，并颁发获奖证书。
英国皇家特许语言家学会中国分会还将为决赛中胜出的前5位选手提供奖学金，每位3000元，限用于参加CIOL“DipTans”高级翻译文凭考试（英国承认的硕士研究生级别的学位证书考试，原英联邦多个成员国的专业翻译上岗证书）。
特等奖选手代表全体参赛选手在颁奖仪式上发言。决赛所有获奖选手都有机会收到担任“华东政法大学法律翻译中心特邀法律翻译人员”的邀请函，参与中心的法律翻译业务，并有机会在大赛结束后不定期参与该中心举办的法律翻译实务与学术研讨会。本届大赛决赛获三等奖以上者，报考2018年华东政法大学翻译硕士、法律语言学方向硕士且进入复试，华东政法大学外语学院将在同等条件下对其优先录取。

十、颁奖仪式
颁奖仪式将于2017年6月24日上午在华东政法大学松江校区举行，届时将邀请全国法律翻译界、法律界、翻译界名家出席颁奖典礼。
大赛组委会设在华东政法大学松江校区集英楼C202室。大赛事务联系人：王老师。联系电话：021-57090148。

姓名		专业
性别		年龄
学历	（1）本科；（2）硕士；（3）博士；（4）其他
学校		学号
身份证号		手机
固定电话		邮箱

试题1 （519 words）
Appreciating the role of property in promoting public welfare necessitates rejecting the Blackstonian conception of property because market failures and the physical characteristics of the resources at stake often require curtailing an owner’s dominion so that ownership can properly serve the public interest. A similar lesson emerges from the robust economic analysis of takings law. This literature indeed shows that compensation is at times required to prevent risk-averse landowners from under-investing in their property and to create a budgetary effect that, assuming public officials are accountable for budget management, forces governments to internalize the costs of their planning decisions. These considerations are particularly pertinent to private homeowners, who are not professional investors and who have purchased a small parcel of land with their life savings, as well as to members of a marginal group with little political clout. But providing private landowners and public officials with proper incentives also implies that, in other cases, full compensation should not be granted. Where a piece of land is owned as part of a diversified investment portfolio, full compensation may lead to inefficient overinvestment, while the possibility of an uncompensated investment is likely to lead to an efficient adjustment of the landowner’s investment decisions commensurate with the risk that the land will be put to public use. Similarly, landowners who are members of powerful and organized groups can use non-legal means to force public officials to weigh their grievances properly. An indiscriminate regime of full compensation may therefore distort the officials’ incentives by systematically encouraging them to impose the burden on the non-organized public or on marginal groups, even when the best planning choice would be to place the burden on powerful or organized groups. The absolutist conception of property and the strict proportionality takings regime are also anathema to the most attractive conceptions of membership and citizenship, which insist on integrating social responsibility into our understanding of ownership. The absolutist conception of property expresses and reinforces an alienated culture, which “underplays the significance of belonging to a community, [and] perceives our membership therein in purely instrumental terms.” In other words, this approach “defines our obligations qua citizens and qua community members as ‘exchanges for monetizable gains,’ . . . [and] thus commodifies both our citizenship and our membership in local communities.” To be sure, the impersonality of market relations is not inherently wrong; quite the contrary, by facilitating dealings “on an explicit, quid pro quo basis,” the market defines an important “sphere of freedom from personal ties and obligations.” A responsible conception of property can and should appreciate these virtues of the market norms. But it should still avoid allowing these norms to override those of the other spheres of society. Property relations participate in the constitution of some of our most cooperative human interactions. Numerous property rules prescribe the rights and obligations of spouses, partners, co-owners, neighbors, and members of local communities. Imposing the competitive norms of the market on these divergent spheres and rejecting the social responsibility of ownership that is part of these ongoing mutual relationships of give and take, would effectively erase these spheres of human interaction.




试题2（509 words）
In the common-law tradition, lawyers and jurists consult the reports of judicial decisions to determine applicable rules of law. Common lawyers conduct this evaluative process both as they plan transactions in the shadow of the law and as they frame cases for litigation. With careful attention to particular holdings, and to trends, dominant voices, and cogent rationales, adept practitioners of the common law can say where the law has settled for the moment and how it might evolve in the future. Judges often emerge as actors in the formulation of legal rules, sifting through the available materials to play the cautiously dynamic role that has come to be seen as the hallmark of common-law judging in the Anglo-American tradition. Occasionally, judges issue transformative opinions, ones that allow us to see both the past and the future more clearly and give voice to a bold new conception of the law that will one day be seen as self-evident. Few such opinions have emerged in the course of the war-on-terror litigation. Instead, as dissenting judges have warned, we have witnessed the “silent erosion” of human rights through the accumulation of balancing opinions by the federal courts. True, the Supreme Court has creatively deployed the writ of habeas corpus to ensure a measure of judicial review for enemy combatants detained, indefinitely, at Guantanamo Bay. In Boumediene v. Bush, moreover, the Court narrowly but decisively reaffirmed the role of the federal district courts in the face of legislation that proposed to confine judicial oversight within the narrow appellate-review boundaries set forth in the Detainee Treatment Act. The Constitution was said to guarantee detainees access to the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and Congress was said to have violated that guarantee by restricting review without providing an adequate substitute. The alternative vision, boldly stated in Justice Scalia’s dissent, called for complete judicial deference in the treatment of alien detainees to the war-making power of the president. Although Justice Scalia did not accuse the majority of treason, he did describe the majority opinion as a bait-and-switch that would complicate the task of prosecuting the war and “almost certainly” lead to the death of more Americans. Wholesale judicial deference leaves the law inarticulate, as judges fail to perform the common-law function of passing on the legality of challenged conduct. As we have seen, the federal courts have failed to define what it means to torture a detainee, to opine on the legality of extrajudicial kidnaping (extraordinary rendition), and to specify what sorts of detainee abuse can be permitted before it rises to the level of cruel, inhuman, or degrading conduct. The federal courts have similarly failed to conclude that war-on-terror detainees enjoy the same protections that apply to other prisoners and pretrial detainees under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. As a result of these judicial silences, one can say very little about the concrete legal status of the rendition, detention, and interrogation tactics deployed in the Bush administration’s war on terror, other than that they appear to be lawful more or less by default.



试题3（485 words）
The notion of restrictive interpretation is often used interchangeably with the principle of in dubio mitius, but the former can also be used to refer to other methods of interpretation, such as the interpretation of exceptions. According to the principle of in dubio mitius, ‘if the meaning of a term is ambiguous, that meaning is to be preferred which is less onerous to the party assuming an obligation, or which interferes less with the territorial and personal supremacy of a party, or involves less general restrictions upon the parties’. Treaty language is not to be interpreted so as to limit state sovereignty or a state’s ‘personal and territorial supremacy’, ‘even though these stipulations do not conflict with such interpretation’. If the language on the existence or scope of an obligation is unclear, the in dubio mitius principle supports the proposition that no or only a minimal obligation should be applied. The application of the principle essentially results in an interpretation in deference to the sovereignty of one specific signatory, the party assuming an obligation (in practice, this is often the respondent state). Such an interpretation is supposed to protect the sovereignty of the parties to a treaty. But most treaty law restricts sovereignty, albeit through the exercise of state sovereignty. The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) initially formulated the in dubio mitius principle as applicable ‘when, in spite of all pertinent considerations, the intention of the Parties still remains doubtful’ and unless its application would lead to an interpretation ‘contrary to the plain terms … and would destroy what has been clearly granted’. The principle is not codified in the VCLT (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) and is unlikely to qualify as a general principle of law or part of customary international law. The validity of applying the principle has also been denied where the language in different authentic versions of a treaty conflicts and the conflict cannot be resolved through the general principles of interpretation. The use of the principle appears to have received more support from scholars than from international courts and tribunals. Although the PCIJ cited the notion of restrictive interpretation (meaning, in this context, the principle of in dubio mitius) in several cases, it relied upon it only as a last resort and always emphasized its limits. The starting point of interpretation remains the terms of the treaty, not the interests of those who drafted the treaty in exercise of their sovereignty with the effect of transferring parts of that sovereignty. In the Wimbledon case, the PCIJ found that a restrictive interpretation stops ‘at the point where [it] would be contrary to the plain terms of the article and would destroy what has been clearly granted’. In the Nuclear Tests case, the ICJ (International Court of Justice) applied a restrictive interpretation to unilateral statements limiting a state’s freedom of action, followed by an extensive approach to whether a commitment existed.